Since their introduction into the U.S. market in 2000, hybrid vehicles have been in increasingly strong demand: sales grew from less than 10,000 cars in 2000 to more than 250,000 in 2006. A hybrid vehicle combines the benefits of gasoline engines and electric motors and delivers better fuel economy than its non-hybrid equivalent. Therefore, the hybrid technology has been considered as a promising tool in the U.S. to reduce CO 2 emission and air pollution and to achieve energy security. Following the recommendation of the National Energy Policy Report (2001) , 1 the U.S. government has been supporting consumer purchase of hybrid vehicles in the forms of federal income tax deductions before 2006 and federal income tax credits since then.
An active governmental role to support the diffusion of this technology can be justified on the ground of environmental externalities and national energy interest: the adoption of hybrid vehicles by U.S. drivers could be too low compared with the socially optimal level because the individual benefit of driving a hybrid vehicle (relative to a conventional vehicle) is smaller than the social benefit. The discrepancy between the individual benefit and the social benefit can be further magnified by the high initial production cost of hybrid vehicles due to the presence of significant economies of scale inherent in the automobile manufacturing industry and by information spillovers among consumers and among firms often present in the diffusion process of new technologies.
2
The United States is increasingly dependent on foreign oil: the proportion of imports in total petroleum products has reached 60 percent in recent years, largely driven by growing motor gasoline consumption. Moreover, while producing an estimated 60 to 70 percent of total urban air pollution and 25 percent of total emission of smog-forming
1 The report was written by the National Energy Policy Development (NEPD) Group established in 2001 by George W. Bush. The goal of the group is to develop a national energy policy designed to promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy for the future.
2 Stoneman and Diederen (1994) argues for more government attention to technology diffusion citing the presence of imperfect information and externalities. Jaffe and Stavins (1999) focus on the gradual diffusion of energy-conservative technologies and suggest the use of both economic incentives and direct regulations.
may result in more hybrid sales than the tax credit program with the same amount of total government subsidy. The better cost-effectiveness of a rebate program should also hold in the income tax credit program for other energy-efficient products aforementioned.
Taking advantage of a rich data set of new vehicle registrations in 22 Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSA) from 1999 to 2006, we estimate a market equilibrium model with both a demand side and a supply side in the spirit of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (henceforth BLP). The demand side is derived from a random coefficient utility model and the supply side assumes that multiproduct firms engage in price competition. Similar to Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) , our estimation employs both aggregate market-level sales data and household-level data. We use the 2001 National Household Travel Survey (2001 NHTS) to augment aggregate sales data. Different from these studies, we observe the sales of the same model in 22 markets and use product fixed effects to control for price endogeneity due to unobserved product attributes. Therefore, our estimation method does not rely on the maintained exogeneity assumption of observed product attributes to unobserved product attributes, which is used to form moment conditions in the literature.
Based on the structural parameter estimates, we first conduct counterfactual simulations to evaluate the effect of rising gasoline prices and government support on the demand for hybrid vehicles in the 22 MSAs. We find that both factors are significant in explaining the increasing popularity of hybrid vehicles. However, due to the small market share of hybrid vehicles, the reduction in both gasoline consumption and CO 2 emission resulted from government support on hybrid vehicle purchases has been inconsequential. With the increasing number of hybrid models introduced into the market and increasing market share of hybrid vehicles, government support should be able to make more significant contribution toward achieving oil independence and environmental objectives. We then compare the federal income tax credit program in 2006 with a rebate program in terms of their cost-effectiveness. We find that the rebate programs costs less government revenue to achieve the same average fuel-efficiency of new vehicle fleet in 2006, suggesting that rebate programs should be favored over income tax credit programs to promote the adoption of energy-efficient products.
Three recent papers have examined several issues related to hybrid vehicles. Kahn (2008) studies the effect of environmental preference on the demand for green products and finds a positive correlation between the adoption of hybrid vehicles and the percentage of registered green party voters in California. Sallee (2008) studies incidence of tax credits for Toyota Prius and shows that consumers capture the significant majority of the benefit from tax subsidies. A more closely related study to ours, Gallagher and Muehlegger (2007) estimate the effect of state and local incentives, rising gasoline prices, and environmental ideology on hybrid vehicle sales and find all three very important. A major difference between our study and these papers is that all of them focus on a single hybrid model or hybrid vehicles alone while we take a structural method to estimate an equilibrium model of U.S. automobile market. Our empirical model allows us to simulate what would happen to the whole market under different scenarios (e.g., under a different federal support scheme) and to examine the response in the demand side and the supply side separately.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background of the study and data used. Section 3 lays out the empirical model and the estimation strategy. Section 4 provides the estimation results. Section 5 conducts simulations and section 6 concludes.
Industry Background and Data
In this section, we first present a brief introduction of the hybrid technology, the market of hybrid vehicles in the U.S., and the government support on the technology. We then discuss the data used.
Background
The current state of fuel economy and emissions produced by a typical automobile is largely a reflection of low efficiency of conventional internal combustion engines: only about 15 percent of the energy from the fuel consumed by these engines gets used for propulsion, and the rest of the energy is lost to engine and driveline inefficiencies and idling. Hybrid vehicles combine power from both a gasoline engine and a electric motor that runs off the electricity from a rechargeable battery. The battery harnesses some of the energy that would be wasted in operations in a typical automobile (such as energy from braking) and then provides power whenever the gasoline engine proves to be inefficient and hence is turned off. Because of the improved fuel economy and reduced emissions, the hybrid technology is considered as a promising technology by the National Energy Policy Report (2001), which concludes that the demand for hybrid vehicles must be increased in order to achieve economies of scale so as to bring the cost of hybrid vehicles down. The group recommended in the report that an efficiency-based income tax incentives be available for purchase of new hybrid vehicles. These tax incentives can help to offset the higher cost of hybrid 5 Another technology, the fuel cell technology represents a more radical departure from vehicles with internal combustion engines. They are propelled by electricity created by fuel cells onboard through a chemical process using hydrogen fuel and oxygen from the air. This emerging technology holds the potential to dramatically reduce oil consumption and harmful emissions. However, fuel cell vehicles are not soon expected to be commercially viable.
6 There are 19 hybrid models available in 2007. According to J.D. Power and Associates, there could be 44 hybrid models in the United States by 2012. 7 A 2005 report by Edmunds.com finds that a hybrid model can cost about $4,000 more on average than its equivalent non-hybrid model in terms of purchase price plus ownership costs over the first five years. For example, a Toyota Prius costs $5,283 more than a Toyota Corolla. However, with the average MPG increases from 35 to 55 MPG, the saving in fuel cost is only about $2,340 over the first five years, assuming annual travel of 15,000 miles and gasoline being $3.00 per gallon.
8 In the second and third calendar quarter after the calendar quarter in which the manufacturer reaches the 60,000 mark, tax credits for hybrid models by this manufacturer become 50% of their original amounts. They are then reduced to 25% in the fourth and fifth calendar quarter and to zero thereafter. Toyota reached the 60,000 mark in June 2006. From October 1, 2006 to the end of March, 2007, hybrid vehicles by Toyota are only eligible for 50% of original tax credits.
Data
There are three data sets used in this study. The first one, from annual issues of Automotive News Market Data Book, contains characteristics and number of sales of virtually all new vehicles sold in the U.S. from 1999 to 2006.
9 Table 2 Column 2 in Table 5 shows the means of several demographics for households living in MSAs. Renter, a dummy variable, equals 1 for the households that living in rented houses and 0, otherwise. Children dummy, also a dummy variable, is 1 for households with children. Columns 3 to 7 present the means of household demographics for different groups based on household vehicle choice. These conditional means provide additional moment conditions in our estimation where we match the predicted moments from the empirical model to these observed moments. As household incomes are categorized and top-coded at $100,000, we provide the probability of new vehicle purchase for six income groups in Table 6 . In our estimation of the empirical model, these conditional probabilities are matched by their empirical counterparts.
In this section, we discuss our empirical model and estimation strategy. Our empirical model closely follows recent empirical literature on differentiated products (e.g., BLP,
Petrin (2002), Berry et al. (2004) ). The empirical model includes both a demand side and a supply side. Vehicle demand is derived from a random coefficient discrete choice model.
A household makes a choice among all new models and an outside alternative to maximize household utility in each year. We use their aggregated decision outcomes (product sales in this case) to recover consumer preference parameters. The supply side assumes that multiproduct firms engage in Betrand competition (taking product choices as given). The first-order conditions of firm profit maximization allow us to recover the marginal cost for each product. In a counterfactual analysis, we then base the recovered marginal cost and the oligopolistic supply curve to solve for new equilibrium prices. We discuss each part separately.
Demand Side
Household's utility from a product is a function of household demographics and product characteristics. Let i denote a household and j denote a product. A household chooses one product from a total of J models of new vehicles and an outside alternative in a given year. The outside alternative captures the decision of not purchasing any new vehicle in the current year. To save notation, we suppress the market index m and time index t, bearing in mind the choice set can vary across markets and years. The utility of household i from product j (in market m at year t) is defined as
where p ij is the price of product j for household i. The price is computed based on the MSRP, the sales tax and federal income tax incentives for hybrid vehicles. 12 X j is a vector of observed product attributes, ξ j the unobserved product attribute, y i the income of household i, and Z i is a vector of household demographics. ij is a random taste shock that has type one extreme value distribution. The specification of the first term in the utility function is assumed to be:
We allow α to vary according to the income group of the household. x jk is the kth product attribute for product j.β ik is the random taste parameter of household i over product attribute k, which is a function of household demographics including those observed by econometrician (z ir ) and those that are unobserved (ν ik ):
The utility of the outside alternative (j = 0) is specified as
where ν i0 , the unobserved household demographics, captures different valuations of the outside alternative by different households due to heterogeneity in vehicle holdings and transportation choices.
Based on the utility function, we can derive the aggregate demand function. Define θ as the vector of all preference parameters. The probability that the household i chooses choice j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., J} is
where p is the vector of prices of all products. ν i is a vector of unobserved demographics for household i. The market demand for choice j for a price vector p is then
Supply Side
The demand side parameters can be estimated without a supply side model. However, a supply side model is needed for the counterfactual analysis where we solve for the prices in a new equilibrium based on firms' price-setting rules derived from the profit maximization problem. Firms are assumed to engage in Betrand competition to maximize the period profit from the whole U.S. market while taking the product mix as given.
The period total variable profit (total revenue minus total variable cost) of a multiproduct firm f is
where F(f ) is the set of products produced by firm f . p j is the price and q j is the sales for product j. vc j is the total variable cost of product j.
The equilibrium price vector is defined, in matrix notation, as
13 We do not consider the role of the CAFE constraints on firms' pricing decision here. See Jacobsen (2007) for an examination of how firms, particularly U.S. firms underprice their fuel-efficient vehicles in order to meet the CAFE standards. In recent years, the CAFE constraints have not been binding for Toyota and Honda who produces the majority of the hybrid vehicles.
where the element of ∆ is
if product j and r produced by same firm 0 otherwise.
(10) Equation (9) underlies the pricing rule in a multiproduct oligopoly: equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs plus markups, ∆ −1 q(p, θ). The implied marginal costs can be computed following mc = p − ∆ −1 q, where p and q are the observed prices and sales.
In a counterfactual analysis, the fixed point of equation (9) can be used to compute new price equilibrium corresponding to a change in the demand equation q(p, θ), providing that we know the relationship between mc and q. Constant marginal cost assumption has been commonly used in recent literature on estimating automobile market equilibrium (for example, Bresnahan (1987) ; Goldberg (1995) ).
14 If marginal costs are not constant with respect to the total output level, the functional relationship between the two has to be recovered in order to find new equilibrium prices in counterfactual scenarios.
Estimation
The preference parameters in the utility function are estimated by matching the predicted market sales as shown in equation (6) with observed sales in each market. The predicted market sales are computed based on a random sample of households from the 2000 Census data while taking into account various government support programs for hybrid vehicles.
Because the federal incentives for hybrid vehicles are in the forms of income tax deductions or income tax credits, they may vary across households depending on household tax liabilities: households with fewer tax liabilities tend to enjoy less tax benefit from buying a hybrid vehicle. To figure out tax incentives for each household, we calculate household income tax liabilities using NBER's online software TAXSIM (version 8.0). TAXSIM takes household income sources and other demographics from survey data as input and returns 14 The constant marginal cost assumption does not reject the existence of economies of scale. A high fixed cost and constant marginal cost can still result in economies of scale.
tax calculations as output.
To illustrate our estimation strategy, which exploits the fact that we observe the demand for each product in many MSAs, we bring the market index m into the utility function and write the utility function as
where δ mj , the mean utility of product j in market m, is the same for all the households in market m. The mean utility from the outside alternative is normalized to zero. µ mij is the household specific utility. The mean utility is specified as follows
where δ j is a product dummy, absorbing the utility that is constant for all households across the markets (including the utility derived from the unobserved product attributes ξ j ). 16 X mj is a vector of product attributes that vary across MSAs. It includes dollars per mile (DPM), which is the gasoline price in market m divided by the MPG of product j.
DPM captures the operating cost of the vehicle. e mj is the part of the mean utility that is unobserved to us.
mu mij is the household specific utility. Following notations in equations (2) and (3), the household specific utility is:
The household specific utility for the outside alternative is defined by equation (4). Denote the parameters in the mean utility as θ 1 = {δ j , γ}, and the parameters in the household 15 TAXSIM and an introduction by Feenberg and Coutts (1993) are available at http://www.nber.org/taxsim.
16 Following equations (2) and (3), δ j = k x jkβk + kn x jk z n β kn + ξ j . Although the parameters from this equation can be estimated once we recover δ j , they are not of our interest in this paper.
In estimating the demand model, a key identification problem arises from the correlation between the vehicle prices and unobserved product attributes, which are represented by a latent variable ξ j . Since better product attributes often command a higher price, failure to take into account the unobserved product attribute often leads to omitted variable bias in the estimate of price coefficient, suggesting that consumers are less price sensitive than they really are (Trajtenberg (1989) ; Berry et al. (1995) ; Petrin (2002) ; Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) ). A common, although strong, identification assumption is that the unobserved product attribute is uncorrelated with observed product attributes. Similar to Nevo (2001) , we avoid invoking this assumption by using product dummies to absorb the unobserved product attribute and observed product attributes that are constant across MSAs.
We, nevertheless, make the assumption that the error term in the mean utility function, e mj , is uncorrelated with market-varying attributes, X mj . Because we only observe vehicle prices (i.e., MSRP) at the national level, e mj may capture local price variations and promotions. e mj may also contain other unobservables such as driving conditions that affect consumers' vehicle preferences. If these local unobservables vary systematically with vehicle fuel economy, the coefficient on DPM is biased downward, suggesting consumers are less sensitive to vehicle fuel cost than what they really are.
17 In the estimation, we include interaction terms between MSA dummies and vehicle types, such as those between MSA dummies and a dummy variable for hybrid models, to control for these local unobservables.
θ 1 and θ 2 can be estimated simultaneously by matching the predicted market shares based on our demand model with observed market shares. However, the large number of product dummies renders this approach impractical because the within-group demeaning method as a way to estimate fixed-effect models cannot be applied in this nonlinear framework. Instead, we estimate the model following an iterative two-stage procedure.
The first stage uses a contracting mapping technique to recover the mean utility δ mj for each product in each market as a nonlinear function of θ 2 . BLP shows that under some mild conditions, for a given a θ 2 , there exists a unique vector of mean utility δ mj that equates the observed market shares in a given market to the predicated market shares.
For a given θ 2 , the unique vector of mean utilities for market m, δ m , can be recovered using a fixed point iteration:
where n is the number of iterations; S o m is the vector of observed market shares in market m while S m is the vector of predicted market shares.
The second stage is a simulated GMM with two sets of moment conditions that are formed based on recovered mean utilities from the first stage for any given θ 2 . The first set of moment conditions is from the exogeneity assumption in equation (12) that e mj is mean independent of X mj . From equation (12), e mj can be written as a function of θ 1 and δ mj , which is recovered as a function of θ 2 from the first stage. Our first set moment conditions M 1 is based on: E e mj (θ 1 , θ 2 )|X mj = 0.
The second set, M 2 , includes 17 micro-moments which match the model predictions to the observed conditional means from the 2001 NHTS as shown in Tables 5 and 6 . For example, we match the predicted probability of new vehicle purchase among households with income less than $15,000 to the observed probability in the data. E P r i (j = 0)|(y i < 15, 000; δ m (θ 2 ), θ 2 , ) = 0.002.
With an initial value of θ 2 , we recover δ mj using the contraction mapping. We form the objective function by stacking the two sets of moment conditions which are functions of the initial value of θ 2 and the recovered δ mj as a function of θ 2 . The GMM estimators θ 1 andθ 2 minimizes:
The procedure involves iteratively updating θ 2 and then δ mj to minimize the objective function. We start with using the identity matrix as the weighting matrix to obtain consistent initial estimates of the parameters and optimal weighting matrix. We then estimate the model using the new weighting matrix.
With the estimation of the demand side, we can recover the marginal cost for each model based on firms' first order condition for profit maximization in equation (9). The first order condition can also be used to simulate new equilibrium prices in the counterfactual scenarios. We perform two sets of simulations for each counterfactual scenario. One set employs constant marginal cost assumption and the other is based on the estimated relationship between the marginal cost and production. Because U.S. domestic sales of a model often do not coincide with total production of the model due to international trade and data on model-level production are not readily available, we use vehicle sales as the proxy for production in the case of non-constant marginal costs and specify the marginal cost of model j as the following:
where ω j includes model attributes and U.S. sales. ζ j is the error term which may include production cost from unobserved product attributes and productivity shock as well.
An endogeneity problem arises in estimating the non-constant marginal cost function given that sales are related to unobserved product attributes. To control for the endogeneity problem, we employ the commonly used identification assumption in the differentiated product literature that unobserved product attributes are mean independent of observed product attributes. Based on this assumption, valid instruments for vehicle sales are pro-vided by the observed attributes of other products. These exclusion restrictions arise naturally in a differentiated-product market, where the level of product differentiation is an important factor in determining equilibrium price and quantity. However, the large number of vehicles offered in the U.S. market yields more instruments than we can directly apply. We construct two "distance" measures for each product as parsimonious instruments for vehicle sales following Li (2006) . The distance measures reflect how differentiated a product is from other products within the firm and outside the firm. The measures are based on distances between two products in a Euclidean space where different weights are applied to different dimensions of the product-characteristics space. The weights are the coefficients of the corresponding product attributes in a hedonic price regression.
Estimation Results
We first report parameter estimates and then use these estimates to calculate price elasticities and implied markups for selected products. Table 7 presents the estimates of the parameters in the mean utility as shown in equation (12). We include product fix effects which absorb the part of the mean utility δ mj that is constant across MSAs. The coefficient on DPM is negative and estimated precisely, reflecting that consumers' vehicle purchase decisions respond to the fuel cost from operating a vehicle. A vehicle with better fuel efficiency hence smaller DPM is valued more than a less fuel-efficient vehicle, ceteris paribus. The identification of this coefficient is based on the cross-MSA sales variation in response to differences in gasoline prices across MSAs: a fuel-efficient vehicle should be more popular in a high gasoline price area than otherwise, all else equal. Based on our demand and supply estimations, we compute demand elasticities with respect to price and markups. The markup for product j is defined as
, where p j and mc j are the price and the marginal cost of product j, respectively. Table 9 reports products, the sales weighted average price elasticity is -10.91 while the average markup is 12.17%.
20 Table 10 reports the estimation results for the marginal cost function. Bearing in mind that we use U.S. sales as the proxy for total production in order to estimate the relationship between the marginal cost and total production at the model level. Due to the fact that imported models can be very poor proxies for their total production, we use only the models produced in the U.S. to estimate the marginal cost function. These models include those produced by the Big Three and foreign transplants in the U.S. as well. Columns (1) and (2) report coefficient estimates assuming that marginal costs do not change with quantity produced. All the listed coefficient estimates are intuitively signed
Honda Civic which has the same look as the non-hybrid Civic as suggested by Kahn (2008) . 20 Our estimate of average markup is closest to Petrin (2002) 's estimate of 16.7 percent which is based on vehicles sold from 1981 to 1993 including cars, vans and pickup trucks. Goldberg (1995) recovers a much larger estimate of 38 percent for cars from 1983 to 1987 while the average benchmark markup in BLP is estimated as 23.9 percent for cars sold between 1971 and 1990. We have about 200 models each year while Petrin (2002) 185 models, Goldberg (1995) and BLP each have about 110 models per year. and all of them except the coefficient on size are significant at the 10% significance level. Columns (3) and (4) are the OLS results for non-constant marginal costs while the results in columns (5) and (6) are from the GMM estimation where the endogeneity of log(sales) is controlled for using product distance measures as instruments. The coefficient estimates on log(sales) in both regressions being negative means that the marginal cost is decreasing, although at a smaller rate, as production expands. 21 Compared to the instrument variable regression, the OLS underestimates the coefficient on log(sales), suggesting a smaller reduction in marginal cost as total production goes up. Because better unobserved product attributes imply a higher marginal cost and at the same time, stronger sales, the observed product attributes bias economies of scale downward in the OLS regression.
21 The J-statistics for over-identification test in the GMM estimation is 0.784, implying a p-value of 0.367. We assume that the relationship between the marginal cost and production for hybrid models is the same as that for non-hybrid models because we only observe two hybrid models produced in the U.S. in our data. We also estimate the model with a second order of log(sales). The coefficient on that is positive but not significantly different from zero. This may suggest that firms have not been operating at the production level that exhibits increasing marginal cost during the period under study.
In this section, we conduct counterfactual simulations to address the effect of rising gasoline prices and federal tax incentives on the diffusion of hybrid vehicles. We then conduct simulations to compare the current income tax incentive program with a rebate program in terms of their cost-effectiveness and their effects on industry profits. We solve new equilibrium prices under each scenario based on the estimates of demand parameters and product marginal costs, assuming firms' objectives are to maximize the total period profit from the whole U.S. market. We then estimate new sales for the 22 MSAs under new equilibrium prices. Before presenting the results, it is worthwhile to note that our simulations assume the product offerings would stay the same under different scenarios.
22 To the extent that both the run-up of the gasoline price and the presence of federal tax incentives strengthen consumer incentives to purchase hybrid vehicles and therefore increase firms'
incentive to offer more hybrid models, our static analysis would underestimate the true effects of these two factors.
Gasoline Prices
Understanding how vehicle choice decisions of consumers respond to changes in gasoline prices has important implications for policies that aim to address energy security and environmental problems related to gasoline consumption. Based on our model estimations, The decision of product choice, although an interesting topic, is out of scope of this paper. A serious approach to this topic involves modeling a dynamic game where the model should contend with several key facts about the auto industry: the industry consists of several big players that act strategically, each of them produces multiple products, and products are differentiated. Table 12 presents the effects of the rising gasoline price on total sales of hybrid vehicles in the 22 MSAs. Column (1) lists the annual average gasoline price weighted by vehicles sales while column (2) gives the increase in gasoline prices in these years relative to that in 1999. Gasoline prices have been continuously increasing over the years except in 2002.
In the absence of these increases, hybrid sales would have dropped quite significantly. 
Federal Tax Incentives
Providing tax incentives for hybrid buyers can be justified on the ground that hybrid vehicles emit less pollutants and CO 2 and reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil and that information spillovers among consumers and producers exist in the diffusion of hybrid technology. We now examine the effectiveness of government support on promoting the adoption of hybrid vehicles by removing income tax deductions before 2006 and tax credits in 2006. Table 13 presents the effects of income tax incentives on both prices and sales of several Without tax incentives, both prices and sales of these hybrid models would be reduced.
The supply price of a 2005 Ford Escape hybrid would be $210 lower as shown in column (4). Comparing with the $521 tax benefit received by an average buyer, it suggests that buyers capture about 60% of the government subsidy and the supplier about 40%. This finding also holds for other hybrid models based on average tax benefits received by buyers in column (3) and price decreases in the absence of government subsidy in column (4).
24
The effect of tax incentives on hybrid vehicle sales in 2005 is less than 7% for the five hybrid models shown in the table. However, the effect of more favorable tax incentives in 2006 is much more significant: for 2006 Toyota Prius, about 34% of its sales can be attributed to the tax credit policy in place. Sallee (2008) estimates that buyers of 2006 Toyota Prius get at least 73% of total tax subsidies using detailed retail price data. In order to explain the finding that consumers capture the significant majority of the benefit from federal tax subsidies in the case of Toyota Prius, whose production was capacity constrained in 2006, he suggests a model where current vehicle prices influence future demand (e.g., due to goodwill). Allowing the intertemporal price effect in our model would intuitively increase the percentage of benefit captured by consumers. Moreover, allowing decreasing marginal cost as we do in our following analysis would also generate the case where consumers capture a higher percentage of tax incentives.
MSAs could be explained by tax credits, comparing to less than 10% in previous years.
It is interesting to note that hybrid sales, although smaller, would still be increasing over time even without tax incentives.
In 2005, U.S. motor gasoline consumption was 9.16 million barrels per day, accounting for about 45% of total U.S. petroleum consumption. Total CO 2 emission from motor vehicle usage was 3.78 million tons per day.
25 Table 15 Nevertheless, the reductions in CO 2 emission and gasoline consumption will become more significant with ever increasing number of hybrid models on the market. 
Tax Credit Versus Rebate
In both income tax deduction and income tax credit programs, households with lower income hence lower income tax lability may not be eligible for the maximum possible incentives. However, these household should be more responsive to tax incentives given that they tend to be more price sensitive. This suggest a rebate program that allows 25 Assuming consumption of one gallon gasoline generates 19.594 pounds of CO 2 .
this section, we compare the income tax credit program with a rebate program, which distributes equal subsidy across households who purchase the same hybrid model and are not subject to AMT.
27
We also examine the effect of the rebate program on industry profit. With the same amount of government spending, the increase in hybrid prices due to subsidy may be higher in the tax credit program than in the rebate program given that high-income households (less price sensitive) tend to receive more income tax benefits than low-income households under the tax credit program. Therefore, the income tax programs may be more favorable to auto manufacturers than the rebate program. Another benefit of such a rebate program is analogous to that in income transfer from high-income households to low-income households, which can be measured by changes in total consumer welfare. We do not quantify this benefit here.
27 In recent years, more and more households in the top income quartile have been subject to AMT, which disqualifies these household for the tax incentives. In the tax rebate program, we assume that households subject to AMT are not eligible for the rebate, either.
program. Meanwhile, total industry variable profit from the 22 MSAs, defined as total revenue minus total variable costs, would decrease slightly in the rebate program. Even thought both programs reach the same level of average fuel-efficiency, there are slightly fewer hybrid models sold in the rebate program, reflecting a stronger demand from lowincome households for Toyota Prius and Honda Civic, two cheapest and most fuel-efficient hybrid models. The rebate program would save about 3.5% in government subsidy. The small magnitude is mainly due to the fact that under the current tax credit program, only families with low income are not able to enjoy full tax incentives due to their low tax liabilities and that the proportion of these households purchasing new vehicles is very small. However, if the tax credit were to be increased or income tax credits for other energy-efficient products are to be considered simultaneously in consumers' vehicle purchase decisions, more households would be constrained by their tax liabilities in getting tax benefit from purchasing hybrid vehicles. Therefore, the rebate program would exhibit 
Non-constant Marginal Costs
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our previous findings with respect to the assumption of marginal costs. To that end, we conduct simulations based on our estimation of the non-constant marginal cost function. One caveat of these simulation results is that the marginal cost function is estimated using U.S. sales as proxies for total 28 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 includes tax credits for many types of energy-efficient products. The maximum amount of credit for qualified home improvements combined is $500 during the two year period of 2006 and 2007. Moreover, a tax credit, up to $2,000, is available for qualified solar energy systems. model production. Although in the estimation of the marginal cost function, we use only domestically produced models (their U.S. sales may be good proxies for their total production), we have to use U.S. sales for all the models as proxies for their total output levels in the simulations due to the lack of production data. To the extent that U.S. sales of imported models account for a smaller share of their total production than domestically produced models, the simulation results for imported models overestimate the reduction in their marginal costs from the increased sales given that the marginal cost function decreases at a decreasing rate with the output level. Table 17 (4) and (6) shows that the effect of the increase in gasoline prices on sales is stronger in case of non-constant marginal cost because the larger sales of hybrid models due to higher gasoline prices reduce their marginal costs, which in turn pushes the sales even larger. The same reason, however, causes the price increases of hybrid models due to higher gasoline price to be smaller in the case of nonconstant marginal costs as shown in columns (3) and (5). We also examine the cost-effectiveness of the income tax credit program and the flat As outline in the National Energy Policy Report (2001) , one of the purposes of sub-29 One exception is in year 2002. This is due to the fact that although the average gasoline price in the 22 MSAs in 2002 was lower than that in 1999 (implying stronger demand for hybrid vehicles in 22 MSAs under the 1999 gasoline price), the opposite was true for the average gasoline price in the whole country (implying weaker demand for hybrid vehicles in the national market, which is the basis for firms' profit maximization problem and hence the computation of new equilibrium prices).
sidizing hybrid vehicle purchase is to help manufacturers achieve economies of scales and reduce the production cost of hybrid vehicles. From the marginal cost function estimation, we find that the marginal cost of vehicle production decrease with respect to output.
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Based on the marginal cost function, we can examine the extent to which government support programs reduce the variable cost of hybrid vehicle production.
31 Table 19 reports the reduction in the average variable cost (AVC) of five of the hybrid models in 2006 brought about by the federal income tax credit program. Columns (3) and (4) are total U.S. sales for each model with and without the income tax incentive, respectively. The increase in U.S. sales due to the tax incentive ranges from 15% to 30%.
The last column reports the reduction in AVCs from the increases in sales. The production of Toyota Prius enjoyed the largest reduction in the AVC due to the largest increase in sales among these hybrid models. The results show that the $3,000 income tax credit on the purchase of a Prius brought its AVC down by $421 in 2006. Table 20 presents the decreases in the variable cost of hybrid vehicles over time due to the federal income tax incentive programs. Columns (1) to (3) report, respectively, the weighted average price, subsidy, and reduction in the AVC for hybrid vehicles in each 30 Because most of the hybrid models are imported and their U.S. sales may not be good proxies for their total production, we are not able to estimate a separate relationship between the marginal cost and the output level for hybrid vehicles.
31 Given the high fixed cost in auto manufacturing, economies of scale can still arise even if the marginal cost of production is constant. However, without observing the fixed cost, we are not able to estimate the decrease in the average cost of production induced by the federal tax incentive programs. Our estimates on the decrease in variable costs provide a lower bound for that.
We find that the gasoline price is indeed an important factor in hybrid vehicle purchase Another finding is that a rebate program that offers enhanced incentives for low-income households compared to the current income tax credit program costs less government revenue in achieving the same average fuel-efficiency of new vehicles. The advantage of a rebate program over an income tax credit program increases with the level of government support. For example, we find that if current tax credits for hybrid models were to be increased by $1,000, a rebate program that achieves the same average fuel-efficiency would cost more than 7% less in government revenue. Although current government support for consumers to adopt energy-efficient products mainly takes the form of income tax credits, our finding calls for wider adoption of flat subsidy programs in future legislations that aim to promote energy conservation and environmental protection.
